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Abstract
The collaborative consumption of an asset, such as a
car, an appliance, or a power tool, tends to degrade it
faster than when it is kept for purely personal use. This
paper examines the rational dynamic decision of when
to share an asset and when to use it only privately. An
optimal policy trades off additional degradation and re-
sulting lifetime reduction against the additional revenue
from sharing. Solving the underlying continuous-time
optimal control problem, we characterize three possible
regimes: personal consumption, full sharing, and par-
tial sharing. Collaborative consumption may be optimal
only at the beginning of the asset’s lifetime; the optimal
time to switch from sharing to pure private consumption
is obtained in closed form.
1. Introduction
Electronic markets for collaborative consumption have
attained liquidity for assets that are intrinsically share-
able. They have rendered the cost (including possible in-
termediary commissions) for sharing transactions small
relative to a borrower’s use value for the needed item,
such as a power tool or a car. Given an effective price
for sharing (net of transaction costs), we consider the
question of how the extra degradation of assets from col-
laborative use, over and above the degradation expected
from private use, determines individuals’ intertemporal
consumption and sharing decisions.
1.1. Literature
The possibility of collaborative consumption [4, 5, 7]
helps decouple individuals’ incentives for owning as-
sets from their (random) needs of using those same as-
sets, clearing the path from an ownership-economy to
an access-economy [1, 3, 10]. Despite the archetypal
nature of sharing as a reciprocal activity which accom-
panied the development of mankind, electronic sharing
markets have come into existence only about a decade
ago. Reasons for this somewhat belated development in-
clude that only recently have intermediaries found ways
to resolve informational asymmetries and match poten-
tial sharing partners sufficiently well, so that the per-
ceived costs for short-term sharing transactions would
not exceed the expected gains from trade. A key in-
formational asymmetry in the context of sharing comes
from the moral hazard related to the unobservability of
the borrower’s actions, which may lead to a suboptimal
effort to exert sufficient care when using the lender’s as-
set. With the help of appropriate insurance contracts
a trusted intermediary can mitigate moral hazard, pro-
vided the parties are sufficiently risk-neutral [16]. Rep-
utation systems [14] have an important additional role
to play by increasing the cost of borrower misbehavior
in terms of rating loss and the resulting decreased abil-
ity to become a trusted counterparty in future sharing
transactions. Here we ignore informational asymme-
tries and turn our attention to the fact that sharing an
asset tends to degrade it faster—even in the absence of
moral hazard—which has not yet been considered in the
literature. Virtually any product has a finite lifetime, due
to early failure, random failure, or wear and tear [2].
Our model uses a continuous-time approximation
for an agent’s dynamic consumption choice problem,
which can be investigated using an optimal control anal-
ysis framework [17]. Because of the inherently linear
structure of the relevant Hamiltonian in the control, the
solution exhibits bang-bang switching behavior, as in
the classical examples provided in the seminal text by
Pontryagin et al. [11]. Switching between known deter-
ministic cash-flow (or utility) streams was recently con-
sidered by Weber [15] using global-optimization meth-
ods. In our context, classical optimal-control theory can
be used to obtain a closed form of the solution to the
agents’ switching problem, the solution of which is re-
lated to the classical Hotelling model for the extraction
of a nonrenewable resource, which in our context cor-
responds to product lifetime in the absence of mainte-
nance investments (see footnote 3).
1.2. Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Sec. 2. introduces the model for an agent’s dynamic
sharing and personal-consumption decisions. Sec. 3.
establishes the dynamic-choice behavior by solving the
agent’s optimal control problem. In Sec. 4., we discuss
comparative statics of the solution. Sec. 5. concludes.
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2. Model
We consider a single risk-neutral agent who owns a
shareable asset. At each moment in time t ≥ 0, the
agent needs the asset with probability θ ∈ [0, 1]. In
other words, the agent’s random need states s˜t, with
realizations in {0, 1},1 are independent and identically
distributed according to
Prob(s˜t = 1) = θ, t ≥ 0.
With this simplifying assumption we employ a
continuous-time approximation, in the sense that while
the length time for which the asset is needed is always
infinitesimally short, over any extended time interval
[t0, t1) of nonzero measure (so 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < ∞), the
aggregate time the agent would expect to need the asset
is θ(t1−t0). When available for personal use the agent’s
instantaneous value of the asset at time t, conditional on
a positive need (st = 1), is V1 = v > 0. Without a need
for the asset (st = 0), the agent’s instantaneous value
for it is V0 = 0. The agent discounts future payoffs at
the continuous discounting rate r > 0. In other words, a
dollar arriving at time t > 0 is worth e−rt to the agent,
the discount thus reflecting the time-value of money.
2.1. Personal Use
The agent’s expected discounted value from purely per-
sonal use over the interval [0, TP ] is
UP =
∫ TP
0
e−rt
(
(1− θ)V0 + θV1
)
dt
=
θv
r
(
1− e−rTP ) ,
where the asset is enjoyed over its personal-
consumption lifetime TP . The smallest upper bound
for the asset’s lifetime value in personal consumption is
the value of the perpetuity θv over the interval [0,∞),
so UP ≤ θv/r.
2.2. Collaborative Consumption
We assume that there is a peer-to-peer sharing market,
where the asset can be offered at the effective price p.
This price includes any commissions charged by a shar-
ing intermediary as well as transaction costs which may
arise when realizing the gains from collaborative con-
sumption.2 The agent is a price taker, and to exclude
the trivial case where renting the item out on a sharing
market is even better than using it when there is a need,
we assume—without loss of generality—that
p < v.
At any time t, the agent would therefore share the item
only if there is no personal need for it. Hence, the
agent’s expected discounted value from sharing the as-
set when it is not needed, in the interval [0, TS ], can be
written in the form
US =
∫ TS
0
e−rt
(
(1− θ)p+ θv) dt
=
(1− θ)p+ θv
r
(
1− e−rTS) ,
where TS is the (pure) sharing-lifetime of the asset.
2.3. Asset-Degradation Dynamics
The asset’s lifetime depends on the nature of its use. The
current degradation of the asset at time t is represented
by the asset’s maintenance state x(t) with values in the
state space X = [0, 1].3 We allow the agent to dynami-
cally decide about participation in the sharing market at
time t, conditional on the maintenance state of the asset.
The agent therefore chooses the control variable u(t)
with values in the control-constraint set U = {0, 1},
where u(t) = 0 indicates personal consumption (i.e., no
sharing) and u(t) = 1 denotes collaborative consump-
tion (i.e., sharing conditional on st = 0) at time t.
When in personal use the asset degrades at the con-
stant rate λ > 0, while it degrades at the possibly ele-
vated rate µ ≥ λ when it is not used by the owner.4 As a
result, the asset-degradation dynamics are given by the
state equation
x˙(t) = −((1− θ)µu(t) + θλ)x(t), x(0) = x0,
for t ≥ 0. The positive initial state x0 is normalized
to 1, without any loss of generality (by a linear change
of units if necessary). Because the right-hand side of
the preceding ordinary equation is always negative (tak-
ing into account the initial condition), the asset’s main-
tenance state is strictly decreasing over time (see also
footnote 3). The asset is fully degraded as soon as it
reaches the discard threshold xd ∈ (0, 1). Hence, for
any admissible control u the agent might choose,5 the
1At time t ≥ 0, the agent has no need for the asset when st = 0 and a need for the asset when st = 1.
2The effective price can also include a less-than-perfect transaction probability as in Razeghian and Weber [13].
3To avoid unnecessary complications we exclude the possibility of a costly maintenance intervention and refurbishment, which would
require additional assumptions about the cost and the effectiveness of such actions, distracting from our main concern, namely the dynamic
tradeoff between personal and collaborative consumption.
4We focus here on wear and tear corresponding to the convex part of the classical “bathtub curve” for the hazard over the product lifecycle
(see, e.g., [9], p. 27), although in practice the hazard-rate dynamics may well be more complicated [8]. In our simple setting, the time of product
“failure” is perfectly known because the asset’s maintenance state x(t) attains the discard threshold xd at the deterministic time t = T .
5By “admissible control” we mean a measurable mapping u : R+ → U .
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endogenous lifetime T of the asset is implicitly speci-
fied by the terminal condition
x(T ) = xd.
Pure personal consumption and full asset sharing, de-
scribed in Secs. 2.1 and 2.2, correspond to optimal con-
trols of u(t) ≡ 0 and u(t) ≡ 1, respectively. The en-
dogenous lifetime T is therefore bracketed by the life-
times under these two extreme modes of consumption,
i.e.,
TS ≤ T ≤ TP ,
for any admissible control u the agent might choose.
3. Dynamic Choice
3.1. Agent’s Control Problem
Given a dynamic choice u(t), for t ∈ [0, T ], the agent’s
expected discounted payoff is
Π(u, T ) =
∫ T
0
e−rt (θp+ (1− θ)ϕu) dt.
The agent’s optimal control problem is therefore
Π(u, T ) −→ max
u(·),T
,
subject to
x˙ = − (θλ+ (1− θ)µu)x, x(0) = 1, x(T ) = xd,
u(t) ∈ U , t ∈ [0, T ].
This corresponds to a Lagrange problem in the calculus
of variations, with endpoint constraint and free endtime,
to which a solution exists [6].
3.2. Optimality Conditions
In order to solve the agent’s optimal control problem,
we first introduce the current-value Hamiltonian
H(x, u, ν) = θv + (1− θ)pu− ν (θλ+ (1− θ)µu)x,
where ν : [0, T ] → R denotes an (absolutely contin-
uous) adjoint variable. The adjoint variable describes
the current value of the change in the maintenance state.
The Hamiltonian represents the current dynamic use
value of the asset (in collaborative and/or private con-
sumption), including the value of the prevailing degra-
dation momentum. Applying Pontryagin’s maximum
principle we obtain the following system of necessary
optimality conditions [11, 17].
1. Maximality. On an optimal state-control trajec-
tory the Hamiltonian needs to be maximal with respect
to the control variable. Because H is linear in u, the
optimal choice of the control variable can be character-
ized by first determining the agent’s indifference on the
switching curve ν = σ(x), which satisfies the relation
H(x, 0, σ(x)) = H(q, 1, σ(x)),
where
H(x, 0, σ(x)) = θv − σ(x)θλx
and
H(x, 1, σ(x)) = θv+(1−θ)p−σ(x) (θλ+ (1− θ)µ)x.
Thus,
σ(x) =
p
µx
(≥ p
µxd
).
For ν ≥ σ(x) it is best to not share (u = 0), while
for ν ≤ σ(x) it is optimal to offer the item for sharing
(u = 1).
2. Adjoint equation. The adjoint equation provides
the law of motion for the adjoint variable ν:
ν˙ = rν −Hx(x, u, ν) = (r + θλ+ (1− θ)µu) ν.
Because of the state-endpoint constraint x(t) = xd, a
transversality condition for the endpoint ν(T ) of the ad-
joint variable is not available. From the preceding law of
motion (adjoint equation) it is clear that ν cannot change
sign, so that necessarily ν(0) > 0. In addition, we know
that ν(t) is exponentially increasing, thus leading to at
most a single switch in the owner’s sharing policy, from
u = 1 (use collaboratively) to u = 0 (use alone). The
initial arc, for u = 1, up to the switching time τ ∈ [0, T ]
is given by
ν(t) = ν(0) exp [(r + θλ+ (1− θ)µ) t] , t ∈ [0, τ ],
while the final arc beyond the switching time is
ν(t) = ν(τ) exp [(r + θλ) (t− τ)] , t ∈ [τ, T ],
with
ν(τ) = ν(0) exp [(r + θλ+ (1− θ)µ) τ ] .
A simplified description of the final arc is therefore
ν(t) = ν(0) exp [(1− θ)µτ + (r + θλ) t] , t ∈ [τ, T ].
3. Endpoint optimality. Because the asset life-
time T is endogenous and subject to optimization,
it needs to satisfy the endpoint optimality condition
H(x(t), u(T ), ν(T )) = 0.
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Figure 1: Optimal degradation dynamics.
Depending on the problem parameters, there can be
three potentially optimal operating regimes: personal
consumption (P) corresponding to no sharing, full shar-
ing (S), or partial sharing (PS); see Fig. 1.
3.2.1. Regime P: Personal Consumption
In the no-sharing regime, the optimal switching time
is τ∗ = 0, i.e., u∗(t) ≡ 0 is optimal for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Thus,
x(t) = xd = exp[−θλT ],
which implies the longest possible optimal asset life-
time,
TP =
ln(1/xd)
θλ
.
The corresponding optimal payoff is
ΠP = Π(0, TP ) =
θv
r
[
1− (xd) rθλ
]
.
3.2.2. Regime S: Full Sharing
In the full-sharing regime, the optimal switching time is
τ∗ = T , i.e., u∗(t) ≡ 1 is optimal for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Hence,
x(t) = xd = exp[−(θλ+ (1− θ)µ)T ],
which implies the shortest possible optimal asset life-
time,
TS =
ln(1/xd)
θλ+ (1− θ)µ =
θλTP
θλ+ (1− θ)µ.
The corresponding optimal payoff is
ΠS = Π(0, TS) =
θv + (1− θ)p
r
[
1− (xd)
r
θλ+(1−θ)µ
]
.
3.2.3. Regime PS: Partial Sharing
Consider now interior switching times τ ∈ (0, 1). Be-
cause of the monotonicity of the adjoint variable in the
preceding optimality conditions, several switches can
never be optimal. The operator therefore starts out of-
fering the asset on the sharing market in off-times and at
some point takes it from the sharing market altogether.
By the definitions of the switching time and the switch-
ing curve σ, it is
ν(τ) = σ(x(τ)) =
p
µx(τ)
= ν(0) exp [(r + θλ+ (1− θ)µ) τ ] .
The initial arc of the asset state is
x(t) = exp [− (θλ+ (1− θ)µ) t] , t ∈ [0, τ ],
while the final arc is given by
x(t) = x(τ) exp [−θλ(t− τ)]
= exp [−(1− θ)µτ − θλt] , t ∈ [τ, T ],
with
x(τ) = exp [− (θλ+ (1− θ)µ) τ ] .
Hence, at the end of the horizon it is
xd = x(t) = exp [−(1− θ)µτ − θλT ] ,
so
T =
ln(1/xd)− (1− θ)µτ
θλ
= TP −
(
1− θ
θ
)(µ
λ
)
τ.
Furthermore, the endpoint optimality implies
0 = H(xd, 0, ν(T )) = θv − ν(T )θλxd,
i.e.,
ν(T ) =
v
λxd
.
Using the earlier description of the final arc of the ad-
joint variable yields
ν(T ) =
v
λxd
= ν(0) exp [(1− θ)µτ + (r + θλ)T ]
= ν(0) e
(r+θλ) ln(1/xd)−(1−θ)µrτ
θλ .
Therefore
ν(0) =
(
v
λxd
)
e−
(r+θλ) ln(1/xd)−(1−θ)µrτ
θλ .
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Taking into account the fact that ν(τ) = σ(x(τ)), the
preceding relation yields the switching time. For this,
note that
ν(τ) =
v
λ
e−
(r+θλ) ln(1/xd)−(1−θ)µrτ
θλ +(r+θλ+(1−θ)µ)τ
xd
=
ve(1+
r
θλ ) ln(xd)+(θλ+(1−θ)µ+(1+ (1−θ)µθλ )r)τ
λxd
=
v
λ
· (xd) rθλ · e(θλ+(1−θ)µ+(1+
(1−θ)µ
θλ )r)τ
and recall
x(τ) = exp [− (θλ+ (1− θ)µ) τ ] ,
so
σ(x(τ)) =
(
p
µ
)
exp [(θλ+ (1− θ)µ) τ ] .
We therefore obtain the optimality condition
p
µ
=
v
λ
e
−(1+ rθλ ) ln
(
1
xd
)
+(1+ (1−θ)µθλ )rτ
xd
,
which yields the optimal switching time
τ∗ =
θλ
r ln
(
λp
µv
)
+ ln
(
1
xd
)
θλ+ (1− θ)µ
=
θλ
θλ+ (1− θ)µ
TP + ln
(
λp
µv
)
r

= TS − θλ
θλ+ (1− θ)µ
[
1
r
ln
(
µv
λp
)]
.
Using the expression for the asset’s lifetime T as a func-
tion of the switching time τ , together with the relation
between TS and TP in Sec. 3.2.2., one therefore obtains
the optimal asset lifetime under partial sharing:
T ∗ =
θλTP + (1− θ)µ
[
1
r ln
(
µv
λp
)]
θλ+ (1− θ)µ
= TS +
(1− θ)µ
θλ+ (1− θ)µ
[
1
r
ln
(
µv
λp
)]
.
And, the optimal payoff is given by:
Π∗ =
θv
r
(
1− e−rT∗
)
+
(1− θ)p
r
(
1− e−rτ∗
)
=
θv + (1− θ)p
r
− (θλ+ (1− θ)µ) p
µr
e−rτ
∗
=
θv + (1− θ)p
r
−A,
where
A =
(θλ+ (1− θ)µ) p
µr
(
(xd)
r
(
µv
λp
)θλ) 1θλ+(1−θ)µ
.
In this we have used the fact that the time the asset is
taken off the sharing market can be expressed in the
compact form
T ∗ − τ∗ = 1
r
ln
(
µv
λp
)
.
This “personal-use time” is positive if and only if
p
v
<
µ
λ
.
Otherwise, the item is always offered for sharing during
its downtime so as to maximize its utilization.
3.3. Optimal Dynamic Sharing Policy
In order to characterize the agent’s optimal dynamic
sharing policy we need to find conditions on the param-
eters for the relevance of regime P, S, or PS in the opti-
mal solution. For this, we first compare the “boundary
regimes” (P and S) and then characterize the situations
where the “interior regime” (PS) is best for the decision-
maker.
3.3.1. Boundary Regimes: P and S
Comparing regimes P and S, it is clear that full sharing
dominates personal consumption if and only if
(1− θ)p
[
1− (xd)
r
θλ+(1−θ)µ
]
does exceed
θv
[
(xd)
r
θλ+(1−θ)µ − (xd) rθλ
]
,
i.e., if and only if the expected revenue from collabora-
tive consumption exceeds the present value of the differ-
ence in usage value due to the shorter asset life induced
by offering it on the sharing market.
3.3.2. Interior Regime: PS
We now examine the optimal switching time τ∗ in
regime PS. This switching time is positive if
xd <
(
λp
µv
)θλ/r
.
A sufficient condition is that the right-hand side of this
inequality exceeds 1, i.e.,
p
v
>
µ
λ
.
Thus, if the ratio of sharing price to usage value (p/v)
is larger than the ratio of asset degradation with sharing
to asset degradation without sharing (µ/λ), then sharing
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will be optimal on some nontrivial time interval. Other-
wise, there is a threshold
θ¯ =
( r
λ
) ln( 1xd)
ln
(
µv
λp
) ,
so that θ < θ¯ implies that sharing is optimal at least
initially.
3.3.3. Summary
The interior partial-sharing regime (PS) is optimal if and
only if
p
v
<
µ
λ
and θ < θ¯.
Finally, ΠP > ΠS if and only if
p
v
>
θ
1− θ
(xd)
r/(θλ+(1−θ)µ) − (xd)r/(θλ)
1− (xd)r/(θλ+(1−θ)µ) .
The policy regions are depicted in Fig. 2. Note that if the
own-degradation rate λ, the degradation threshold xd or
the ratio (µv)/(λp) are sufficiently small, the threshold
θ¯ exceeds 1, so θ ∈ [0, 1] can never exceed θ¯.
Figure 2: Agent’s optimal dynamic consumption policy.
4. Managerial Implications
To draw conclusions for managerial decisions, it is use-
ful to examine the sensitivity of the rational sharing be-
havior to key parameters.
4.1. Comparative Statics of τ ∗
Consider first the sensitivity of the optimal switching
time under partial sharing; the latter corresponds to the
time for which goods are rationally shared, thus min-
imizing the asset downtime. By straightforward dif-
ferentiation one can show that the optimal switching
time τ∗ is increasing in the discount rate r and the shar-
ing price p. Hence, as agents become less concerned
about the future or the sharing market promises greater
economic rents, assets are used collaboratively for a
longer time. On the other hand, the switching time is
decreasing in the discard threshold xd and the contin-
gent consumption value v. This means that less durable
goods get shared for less time, and—similarly—an in-
crease in the asset’s need-contingent personal consump-
tion value can only lead to less sharing. With respect to
the likelihood of need one obtains that τ∗ is decreasing
in θ if and only if−(θλ+(1−θ)µ)−(θ¯−θ)(λ−µ) < 0.
This in turn is equivalent to 0 < θ¯λ + (1 − θ¯)µ, which
is always satisfied. A larger personal utilization of the
asset leads to a shorter collaborative-consumption time.
Regarding the effect of changes in the degradation
rates, consider first an increase in the sharing-related el-
evated degradation constant µ. The switching time τ∗
decreases in µ if and only if
− θ
µ
(θλ+ (1− θ)µ)− (1− θ)(θ¯ − θ) ln
(
µv
λp
)
< 0,
which is always satisfied in the interior of the
partial-sharing regime. Hence, an increase of the
degradation from collaborative consumption leads—
unsurprisingly—to a shorter time of sharing.
Finally, the monotonicity of the switching on the
“natural” degradation from renting is not definite, and
depends on the parameters. Indeed, τ∗ is increasing in λ
if and only if
(θλ+ (1− θ)µ)
 1
ln
(
µv
λp
) − 1
 > (θ¯ − θ)λ.
For example, the inequality does not hold when p be-
comes small enough. In that case, the switching time
decreases in λ. The reason for the sign-ambiguity is that
λ is important both when the asset is shared and when it
is not shared.
4.2. Comparative Statics of Π∗
Consider first the boundary regimes of personal con-
sumption (P) and full sharing (S). One can show that
ΠP is increasing in θ/r and v, and that it is decreasing
in xd and λ. One can also show that ΠS is increasing
in v and p, and that it is decreasing in xd, r, µ, and λ.
The comparative statics of Π∗ are more complicated. It
is clear that it is decreasing in xd and decreasing in r.
4.3. Comparative Statics of Lifetimes
Let ∆ = TP − TS be the diameter of the set of attain-
able lifetimes. Then ∆ is decreasing in xd, λ/µ, and θ.
Furthermore, because TP → ∞ as θ → 0+ while TP
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stays bounded, we also obtain that ∆→∞ as θ → 0+.
This means that when personal utilization tends to zero,
the agent can make the asset last an arbitrarily long time
by withholding it from the peer-to-peer sharing market.
5. Conclusion
The economic optimality of sharing does not just de-
pend on whether an item is idle at any given time. Our
analysis shows that the lifetime value of an asset is
generally not optimized by maximizing its utilization,
as it is sometimes suggested in the literature on shar-
ing. Because increased utilization decreases its life-
time, the sharing price must be sufficiently large to jus-
tify collaborative consumption, even in the absence of
moral hazard. The second-order consequence of shar-
ing markets is to influence product durability because
more highly used assets degrade faster.6 The solution
to the agent’s dynamic decision problem shows that
sharing is a beginning-of-life phenomenon: collabora-
tively used products are fairly new. This means that
at relatively low maintenance state of the product in-
dividuals may become reluctant to share, which there-
fore decreases the end-of-life utilization of assets. The
latter would be further compounded by impending re-
placement costs, which were not considered in this pa-
per. Embedding the optimal sharing decisions into a
larger product-replacement problem remains an inter-
esting topic for future research. In addition, there is a
set of activities concerned with extending the product
life (e.g., through refurbishments and repairs), which
deserves more detailed investigation in the context of
individuals’ asset-acquisition and use decisions.
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